entia-et-nomina-schedule-v-2-daily-schedule
Attention: note that on Tuesday the above schedule is only approximate – the Coffee Break actually begins at 11:10, and the first lecture at 11:30, not 11:35.
The printable version of the detailed program is here:
Title: Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents
Abstract:
In the series of talks, I weave together two threads present in the philosophy of Branching Time—semantics and metaphysics. I relate the semantic theories introduced in the setting to their underlying, metaphysical considerations. In the model of Branching Time, alternative paths of evolution of a system are represented by a treelike structure. I first investigate the metaphysical significance of the model. I pay special attention to the assumption of modal neutrality which has been widely accepted in the field. According to modal neutrality, all elements of the branching structure are equally real. In particular, no part of the structure can be absolutely distinguished as actual. I call the brand of theories that accept modal neutrality Branching Realism. I investigate how the assumption of modal neutrality influences the semantic treatment of future contingents, i.e., statements concerning possible, but not necessary, future events. I argue that realistic set-up is particularly hostile to futurism (i.e., the thesis that some future contingents are true). Against the background of Ockhamist semantics, I outline a number of alternatives available to Branching Realists; specifically: modalism, extremism, three-valued semantics, supervaluationism, and relativism (including assessment relativism, history relativism, and local relativism). Then, I investigate the semantic theories that combine branching with futurism. The Thin Red Line theory, as I understand it, took upon itself the unpromising task of introducing futurism into the Genuinely Realistic worldview. It generates a tension that can be, and has been, exploited to attack this theory on metaphysical and semantic grounds. I conclude that the only way to defend futurism in the context of branching is by rejecting modal neutrality. I call this view Branching Actualism. In Branching Actualism, we can conditionalize the truth value of sentences about the future on what will actually happen in the future. Then, bivalence of future contingents becomes a rather non-controversial idea. I argue that Branching Actualism avoids the the objections that threatened the Thin Red Line theory.
FIRST AND SECOND TALK:
TITLE: General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations I, II
ABSTRACT: Step by step we build up a general framework for studying the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization.
THIRD TALK:
TITLE: How much can a Bayesian agent learn?
ABSTRACT: The Bayes Blind Spot of a Bayesian Agent is the set of probability measures on a Boolean algebra that are absolutely continuous with respect to the background probability measure (prior) of a Bayesian Agent on the algebra and which the Bayesian Agent cannot learn by conditionalizing no matter what (possibly uncertain) evidence he has about the elements in the Boolean algebra. We investigate the size of the Blind Spot in the finite and infinite cases.
Title: Independence and Maximality in Set Theory
It is well-known that the standard axioms of set theory (ZFC) do not
suffice to settle many natural set-theoretic questions (and some
category-theoretic ones for that matter). One way that many set
theorists (including Godel and contemporary scholars) have sought to
resolve this independence is through the use of *maximality*
principles: argue that our set concept should engender the
structure(s) satisfying it with many and varied sets (in some
mathematically precise sense). This series of lectures aims to
introduce students to the phenomenon of set-theoretic independence and
explore principles aiming to capture maximality.
In Lecture 1 (Independence and Large Cardinals) we’ll explore the
techniques and philosophical issues surrounding two kinds of
independence: statements (such as *Projective Determinacy*) that are
*responsive* to the addition of large cardinal axioms (which we’ll
also examine), and statements *unresponsive* to the addition of large
cardinals (such as the *Continuum Hypothesis*). We’ll show how strong
large cardinal principles can be characterised through elementary
embeddings, and then make some remarks as to how far this can be
extended, looking at where and how they become inconsistent, and
making some philosophical observations.
In Lecture 2 (Reflection and Independence) we’ll examine one way the
existence of large cardinals has been motivated: through the use of
*reflection principles*, which aim to say (in some mathematically
precise sense) that a structure satisfying our concept of set should
be indistinguishable from one of its initial segments. We note a
challenge posed by Koellner: reflection principles seem either *weak*
or *inconsistent*. We’ll then explore two attempts to surmount
Koellner’s challenge: the addition of embeddings and the use of a
second-order satisfaction predicate.
In Lecture 3 (Absoluteness Principles) we’ll look at a third kind of
principle that has been said to capture the maximality of
set-theoretic structures, through asserting the absoluteness between
certain structures. In this regard we’ll look at two approaches:
forcing axioms and the Inner Model Hypothesis. Again we’ll see where
and how these kinds of principles go inconsistent, but what can be
accomplished with them. We’ll discuss a third problem in the
discussion of maximality: how to synthesise mutually inconsistent
principles. We’ll conclude that there’s lots of interesting
philosophical and mathematical work to be done in the area!
10:00 – 11:00 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 1 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory I)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion
11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break
11:35 – 12:15 – Zuzana Rybaříková – Logic and Ontology of A. N. Prior
12:15 – 12:25 – Commentary 1 (Valerie Lynn Therrien)
12:25 – 12:35 – Commentary 2 (Tomasz Zyglewicz)
12:35 – 12:45 – discussion
12:45 – 13:45 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 1 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents I)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion
14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break
15:30 – 16:30 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 1 (General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations I)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion
16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break
17:15 – 17:55 – Tomasz Steifer – Optimal Predictors and what does it mean to better predict?
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Paulina Piękoś, Agnieszka Proszewska)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Michał Tomasz Godziszewski)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion
11:10 – 11:30 – Coffee Break
11:30 – 12:30 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 2 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents II)
12:30 – 12:45 – discussion
12:45 – 13:45 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 2 (General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations II)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion
14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break
15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 2 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory II)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion
16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break
17:15 – 17:55 – Paulina Piękoś, Agnieszka Proszewska – The evolution of a concept of feasible computation and its theoretical and practical implications
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Dariusz Kalociński)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Antonio Matamoros Ochman)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion
10:00 – 11:00 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 3 (How much can a Bayesian agent learn?)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion
11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break
11:35 – 12:35 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 1 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory I)
12:35 – 12:50 – discussion
12:50 – 13:30 – Dariusz Kalociński – Effects of Game Length and Social Influence on Evolution of Semantics
13:30 – 13:40 – Commentary 1 (Jonathan Mai)
13:40 – 13:50 – Commentary 2 (Ewa Kalinowska, Adam Izdebski)
13:50 – 14:00 – discussion
14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break
15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 3 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory III)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion
16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break
17:15 – 17:55 – Valerie Lynn Therrien – Wittgenstein and the Labirynth of “Actual Infinity”: The Critique of Transfinite Set Theory
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Marek Czarnecki)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Maciej Bednarski)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion
10:00 – 11:00 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 2 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory II)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion
11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break
11:35 – 12:15 – Juliusz Doboszewski – On epistemic holes in relativistic spacetimes
12:15 – 12:25 – Commentary 1 (Tomasz Steifer)
12:25 – 12:35 – Commentary 2 (Michał Tomasz Godziszewski)
12:35 – 12:45 – discussion
12:45 – 13:45 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 3 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents III)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion
14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break
15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 4 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory IV)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion
16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break
17:15 – 17:55 – Bartosz Wcisło – Compositional truth and conservativity
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Juliusz Doboszewski)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Rafał Urbaniak)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion
10:00 – 11:00 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 4 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents IV)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion
11:15 – 11:55 – Marek Czarnecki – Approximate truth for finite models and modal logic
11:55 – 12:05 – Commentary 1 (Bartosz Wcisło)
12:05 – 12:15 – Commentary 2 (Mateusz Łełyk)
12:15 – 12:30 – discussion
12:30 – 13:00 – Coffee Break
13:00 – 13:40 – Jonathan Mai – Resistant Rigidity
13:40 – 13:50 – Commentary 1 (Zuzana Rybaříková)
13:50 – 14:00 – Commentary 2 (Tadeusz Ciecierski)
14:00 – 14:10 – discussion
14:10 – 15:10 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 3 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory III)
15:10 – 15:25 – discussion
Dear All,
the deadline for submitting the extended abstracts to Entia et Nomina 2016 has been extended!
The new deadline is Saturday, July 30th.
Submit your abstracts via e-mail by sending it to entia2016@gmail.com
The “Entia et Nomina” series features English language workshops for young researchers in formally oriented philosophy, in particular in logic, philosophy of science, formal epistemology and philosophy of language. The aim of the workshop is to foster cooperation among young philosophers with a formal bent from various research groups. The fifth workshop in the series will take place from 5 to 9 September in Warsaw, Poland.
Invited speakers:
Authors of contributed papers are requested to submit extended abstracts of about 1000 words, prepared for blind-review (in pdf format), by July, the 24th, 2016, to entia2016@gmail.com. Authors of accepted papers will have 40 minutes to present their work. Each paper will be followed by a 10 minute commentary prepared beforehand by another participant. Accepted participants might also be asked to comment on at least one talk. Commentaries will be followed by 10-15 minutes of discussion. Applications can be made also for the role of commentator only. We aim to make the short versions of the accepted papers available to the participants ahead of the conference.
Local Organising Committee: Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (mtgodziszewski@gmail.com), Mateusz Łełyk, Tomasz Steifer, Antonio Matamoros Ochman
∃ntia et Nomin∀ 2016 